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THE VOLUNTARY ABSTENTION PRINCIPLE AND
JAPAN: SOME LEGAL AND POLITICAL
IMPLICATIONS
TOSHIO NISHIt

On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman issued two
separate proclamations regarding the high seas and the continental
shelf.' Strictly speaking, the Truman Proclamation regarding the
high seas asserts unilaterally the national rights of the United States
to establish exclusive conservation zones on the high seas
"contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing
activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale." Although the Truman Proclamation
did not extend U.S. national sovereignty over this area, it claimed the
right of the United States to establish jurisdiction under which fishing activities of other nations were affected.
C. B. Salak, Jr., pointed out that "jurisdiction and control to be
exercised over high seas fisheries under that proclamation is not an
extension of sovereignty beyond three miles from shore, but rather a
special type of jurisdiction for a limited purpose, a jurisdiction which
must be jointly exercised whenever the substantial interests of more
than one nation are involved." ' Just what this "special type of juristB.A., Kwansei Gakuin University, Japan; M.A., University of Washington; currently
working toward Ph.D.
1. Regarding the Proclamation and its formulation, Whiteman gives a succinct summarization in 4 Dig. of Int'l L., Pub. No. 7825, at 945-62 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Whiteman]. For its international influences, see F. Christy, Jr. and A. Scott, The Common
Wealth in Ocean Fisheries 160-67 (1965); D. Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries
233-40 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Johnston] ; Selak, Recent Developments in High Seas
Fisheries Jurisdiction Under the Presidential Proclamation of 1945, 44 Am. J. Int'l L.
670-81 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Selak]. Further, regarding the original considerations of
the proclamation see Proclamations Concerning United States Jurisdiction Over Natural
Resources in Coastal Seas and the High Seas, XIII Dep't State Bull. No. 327, at 484-87
(1945). Also, regarding interpretation of the Proclamation, see W. Bishop, Jr., International
Law: Cases and Materials 537-43 (1962), and Chapman, United States Policy on High Seas
Fisheries, XX Dep't State Bull. No. 498, at 67-71, 80 (1949). In his article High Seas
Fisheries and the Law: A Case Study in the North Pacific, in The Fisheries Problems in
Resources Management 120, 125 (J. Crutchfield ed. 1965), R. Johnson stated, "This
proclamation, although duly announced, was never effectuated."
2. Selak, supra note 1, at 679. I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 230-31
(1966) wrote:
Ad hoc, somewhat anomalous, claims to fishery conservation zones as such on
the high seas have been made, notably in a proclamation by the United States
President in 1945. Whatever the justification for extended claims to take fish
exclusively, unilateral claims to take conservation measures involving abstention by other states have been resisted; in other words, the reference to con-
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diction for a limited purpose" is, and what criteria should be employed, and applied to what resources, in order to justify the
proclamation of one nation's interests over another's on the high
seas, however, remains unanswered.
Further, although the U.S. government "regards it as proper to
establish conservation zones ... where fishing activities have been or
shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its nationals alone,"
what then happens when a newcomer wishes to join in high seas
fishery proposing a cooperative joint conservation program?3 Presumably the underlying theory in the Truman Proclamation follows
the logic of the division of the oceans of the world into segments,
which would engender the justification of establishing a "special type
of jurisdiction for a limited purpose." In other words, the Truman
Proclamation, employing the unilateral standards of American conservation philosophy supported by domestic socio-economic and
political necessities, attempted to assert the exclusive competence of
the United States on the high seas.
More specifically, since no international agreements existed to
prevent other nations from entering into Pacific halibut or Alaskan
servation as a reason for unilateral assertion of rights to control fish stocks
makes no legal difference.
Clearly treaty arrangements may provide a reasonably stable conservation
regime involving also a negotiated distribution of marine resources. The object
of a treaty will often be the maintenance of the maximum sustainable yield of
the fish stock combined with principles of equal access and equal limitations
on fishing. Conservation thus appears in conjunction with allocation of
resources. Another relevant factor is a dislike of the principle of 'free competition' by states unable to compete on the same basis and which, as underdeveloped countries, claim a priority of needs. Moreover, commercial fishing
by non-regional interests generates regional maritime zones.
3. Johnston, supra note 1, at 333:
The real significance of the declaration lies in the priority it gives to conservation needs, rather than in the degree of authority, modified or unshared, that
it claims for the purposes of conservation ....Yet it is clear that ...[until]
the need for conservation is accepted by other exploiting states, the national
conservation program may be enforced unilaterally against all comers until a
joint authority is acceptable. That is, the United States implicitly claims an
unshared authority over conservation until the conditions for its modification
are met.
Further, he continues:
[P] ermissive competence claimed in the Proclamation anticipates a scheme of
modified conservation authority, shared by all exploiting states, not a scheme
of unshared conservation authority vested solely in the United States. Id. at
334.
However, the question still remains: whose need for conservation should be accepted by
other exploiting states? The primary intention of the Santiago Declaration by Peru, Ecuador
and Chile lies in the priority it gives to conservation needs, which are accepted by these
three exploiting nations, rather than a concept of wider territorial waters. They consider the
200-mile maritime zone as a necessary means for ensuring their conservation programs.
Should the ends justify the means?
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salmon fishing operations right after World War II, the primary pur-

pose of the Truman Proclamation was to prevent future fishing disputes with Japan such as the United States had experienced over
Bristol Bay salmon in 1936 and 1937. 4 As a press statement released
by the U.S. Government at the time of the delivery of the Truman
Proclamation explicitly stated:
As a result of the establishment of this new policy, the United
States will be able to protect effectively, for instance, its most
valuable fishery, that for the Alaska salmon.'

Certainly, during the occupation of Japan, such a protection of
Alaskan salmon from Japanese fishermen was unnecessary, simply
because of the strict regulations imposed by the MacArthur Line,
which remained in effect until April 25, 1952, three days prior to
4. In 1936 the Japanese Government announced that it would undertake a three-year
scientific fisheries research program to study Bristol Bay salmon resources. This announcement raised serious legal and ethical objections among American fishermen. Alaskan fishermen attempted to mobilize public antipathy against Japanese "encroachment" on "their"
fishing resources. Concurrent Japanese expansion onto the Chinese mainland further
aggravated the Alaskan anti-Japanese climate. The dispute was complicated by the fact that
the United States maintained three-mile territorial waters. Thus, Japan legally could fish for
salmon or halibut outside Alaskan territorial waters, and the United States did not possess a
valid legal basis to demand that Japan desist.
On November 22, 1937, the U.S. Government delivered a statement to the Japanese
Government, declaring that the Alaskan salmon belonged exclusively to the United States
since the resources had been conserved for many years under strict American regulations.
The U.S. Government did not discuss the legal technicalities of its three-mile territorial
water, but only emphasized the equity of its exclusive claim over the resources. Although
the Japanese Government was fully aware of its advantageous legal position in this dispute,
due to tense world politics, it accepted the American claim. However, no diplomatic agreement was transacted.
5. Proclamation Concerning United States Jurisdictionover NaturalResources on Coastal
Areas and the High Seas, XII Dep't State Bull. No. 327, at 484 (1945).
An interesting relationship exists between the Truman Proclamation regarding the high
seas, issued on September 28, 1945, and the Statement of United States Policy with Respect
to Fishing and Aquatic Industries of Japan [see Occupation Orders for JapaneseFishingand
Aquatic Industries, XIV Dep't State Bull. No. 348, at 346-47 (1946)] which was sent to the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP) on November 13, 1945 and
used to formulate the "MacArthur Line."
During the period of occupation, the Supreme Commander should be
guided, subject to military considerations, by the following general principles:
b The coastal fisheries and fish culture should be utilized as the
primary sources for domestic consumption. To the extent that
fish culture and coastal fisheries are unable to meet the
minimum domestic requirements, deep sea fisheries and other
fisheries in waters open to Japanese operation may be utilized
where security and political considerations permit. Deep sea fishing in areas near United States territory or near United States
island responsibilities should not be authorized. Japanese fishing
should not be permitted near areas under Allied jurisdiction
without prior permission from the country concerned. These
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when the San Francisco Peace Treaty became effective.6 What is
more, the primary intention of the Truman Proclamation was successfully carried into the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty as a concrete
legality binding upon Japanese fishing operations in the North
Pacific. This was carried out principally through the doctrine of
voluntary abstention. Although the United States proposed adoption
of the principle of voluntary abstention as a rule of international law
at both the Rome and Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea,
prohibitions should continue until international agreements are
negotiated permitting Japanese fishing in these areas.
d Japanese fishing operations should conform strictly to:
(3) The policies or rules governing specific fisheries announced by the United States, or by other
governments in conformity with policies announced by the United States with respect to
coastal fisheries....
It is clear that these provisions confirmed the primary intention of the Truman Proclamation, which was "effectuated" in terms of the "MacArthur Line." The U.S. Government
attempted to formulate a rationalization to support its particular national interests and their
implementation disregarding then-existing international laws or agreements. This action is
not a commendable one, because it permits a particular nation first to execute whatever
policy it deems necessary and after that to formulate specific legal justification for its
policy, instead of consulting international laws or agreements for the limits of implementing
such national interests upon another nation.
6. The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed on September 8, 1951, bears a peculiar relationship to the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty signed on May 9, 1952. According to Article IX
of the Peace Treaty, "Japan will enter promptly into negotiation with the Allied powers so
desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the
regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the
high seas." The following chronology illustrates the progression of events:
April 17-18, 1950: The General Conference of the Pacific Northwest Trade Association
adopted the resolution "that no peace treaty should be entered into with Japan by either
Canada or the United States until and unless definite and binding commitments are made by
Japan which will adequately protect the interests of Canada and the United States in their
coastal fisheries not only within but beyond territorial waters." Bishop, Need for a Japanese
FisheriesAgreement, 45 Am. J. Int'l L. 712 (1951).
February 7, 1951: Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida sent a letter to U.S. Ambassador
John Foster Dulles stating that Japan would be ready to enter into negotiation with other
countries for the conclusion of the equitable fisheries arrangements. Whiteman, supra note
1, at 989-90.
July, 1951: "Agreement was finally reached on the proposals [of the Tripartite Fisheries
Treaty] .... and the Governments of Canada and Japan were asked if they were ready to
enter into negotiations for a fisheries treaty on this general basis." Herrington, Problems
Affecting North Pacific Fisheries, XXVI Dep't State Bull. No. 662, at 340-41 (1952).
September 8, 1951: The San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed by Japan, the United
States, and 47 other nations.
October 18, 1951: The Japanese Government invited the United States and Canada to
Tokyo to convene the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty negotiations.
November 4-December 14, 1951: The negotiations began in Tokyo and the International
Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean was adopted.
April 15, 1952: President Truman ratified the Peace Treaty.
April 25, 1952: The "MacArthur Line" was abolished by a SCAP memorandum.
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both times this was rejected." While in the case of the Tripartite
Fisheries Treaty, at least, the less-than-traditional principle of voluntary abstention has become part of international agreement, the very
traditional doctrine, that of freedom of the high seas, seems to have
become more and more impractical with the passage of time.
The original doctrine of freedom of the high seas was formulated
and developed by Hugo Grotius,8 who was attempting to defend
April 28, 1952: The Peace Treaty went into effect.
May 9, 1952: The Fisheries Treaty was signed by all parties in Tokyo.
June 12, 1953: The Fisheries Treaty entered into force. Actual negotiations for the
Fisheries Treaty began almost a year ahead of Japanese independence. In order to give the
Japanese Government a fair opportunity to negotiate independently with the governments of
the United States and Canada, the U.S. occupation forces granted ad hoc sovereignty to
Japan from November 4 to December 14, 1951. Further, even after the adoption of the
Fisheries Treaty on December 14, 1951, the "MacArthur Line" still remained in effect until
April 25, 1952. What was the function of Japanese ad hoc sovereignty except merely as a
display of American "fair" diplomacy? In other words, the Fisheries Treaty was ready for
Japan to sign, not to negotiate, right after she was granted normal and permanent
independence. Thus, Article IX of the Peace Treaty did not serve its intended function,
simply because by the time it became effective no necessity existed for either Japan or the
United States to convene and conclude negotiations concerning North Pacific fisheries problems. However, Article IX did serve to impose the necessary legality binding Japan to sign
the Fisheries Treaty.
7. See Whiteman, supra note 1, at 968-77. Japan opposed adoption of the joint proposal
of Canada and the United States for these two reasons:
[F]irst, that "the procedure known as abstention ... had nothing to do with
the conservation measures inasmuch as it lacked scientific basis, thus being
contradictory to the articles concerning conservation which had already been
adopted in the Committee"; secondly,.. . the proposal on abstention was
based on the assumption that any State would not be disposed to spend
money for the restoration of productivity of certain stocks of fish unless other
States would abstain from fishing them; further it was unreasonable that the
State giving protection to a part of certain stocks of fish should claim the
monopoloy of those stocks of fish as a whole; and it was not fair that a State
responsible for the depletion caused by intensive fishing should ask other
States to abstain. Id. at 974.
8. See Alexandrowicz, Freitas Versus Grotius, XXIV Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 162-82 (1959).
He reveals distinct conceptual differences between the two lawyers. Further, for both historical and contemporary evaluations of the concept of "freedom of the seas," Johnston,
supra note 1, at 303-17, and The Law of Nations 328-30 (H. Briggs ed., 2d ed. 1952)
[hereinafter cited as Briggs]. J. Bingham, Report on the International Law of Pacific Coastal
Fisheries 23 (1938) advocated that the doctrine of freedom of the seas was "a product of
the interplay of national interests." Although I believe the concept of a 3-mile limit of
territorial waters is an established and "necessary" international rule, I agree with Bingham's
arguments, particularly concerning ambiguities of the application of width of territorial
waters and the doctrine of freedom of the seas. However, it seems to me that Bingham did
not provide a sufficiently reasonable methodology to establish several concepts he advocated. He strongly emphasized the role of national interests in formulating an international law-with which I agree-but did not indicate there is a limit to which national
interests of one nation can play their role in the formulation and implementation of international law. For instance, he stated "[to establish this [the exercise of governmental
power beyond the 3-mile limit] as law will require only its assertion by a powerful state on
behalf of a clearly just claim, and skillful diplomatic support of the assertion." Id. at 41.
According to this method of establishing an international law by dependence upon power
for conflict resolution, legal anarchy is more likely to occur than a settlement.
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Dutch national interests in East India and the Indian Ocean against
Portugal, which held extensive political, economic and religious
interests in that region. While it was through Grotius that this concept came to be developed as an international rule, Grotius' primary
intention was to protect one particular national interest from
another in a conflict situation. When a conflict of mutually incompatible interests is expressed in a manifest confrontation between
nation-states, each nation-state attempts to define the conflict
situation subjectively in order to maximize its gains and minimize its
losses. Thus, the concept of freedom of the high seas in terms of
three-mile-limit territorial waters illustrates an acute manifestation of
political conflict manipulated by one nation against another in order
to achieve a legal conclusion for the justification of certain unilateral
national policies or claims. That is, in a conflict situation over the
utilization of specific high seas resources, where appropriate international agreements are absent which would regulate the actions of
nation-states interested in such resources, these nation-states would
tend to formulate and implement their own legal vindications for the
purpose of acquiring and maximizing exclusive utilization of the
resources in question. From this perspective, freedom of the high
seas is not and cannot be absolutely "free" from claims to common
use of the high seas. Because of these conditions, there remains a
constant question as to the practicability or applicability of freedom
of the high seas to the roles of present day national interests in the
field of world politics.
As far as the development of an operational definition of "freedom of the high seas" goes, the doctrine has been described as
follows:
[N] o state can exercise authority over any vessels on the high seas
except those flying its own flag; in positive form, it means that in
time of peace every State and its inhabitants may make use of the
high seas for navigation, fishing, the collection of its fauna and flora,
the laying of submarine cables, and flying above it.
[V] essels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of
the State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the high seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial
sovereignty upon the high seas, no State may
exercise any kind of
9
jurisdiction over foreign vessels upon them.

These statements clearly express the idea of the national legal
sovereignty of all nations on the high seas-"the right of one nation
9. Briggs, supra note 8, at 329.
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to pursue its own policies without asking permission of another."' 0
However, it becomes a different question as to whether or not a
nation can possess "political sovereignty" on the high seas or, in
other words, possess the capability or capacity of exercising such a
legal right independently.
Applying this discussion to the specific situation existing between
Japan and the United States in 1952, it is clear that Japan possessed
the legal right and sovereignty to pursue fishing operations wherever
she chose, but did not possess sufficient political strength or
sovereignty to exercise independently such legal rights. On the other
hand, the United States, being well aware of her own superior position at the time, could exercise her full political sovereignty, which
permitted her to disregard Japanese legal sovereignty on the high
seas. This peculiar relationship between Japan and the United States
at the time is an example of power politics and illustrates the fact
that many times political sovereignty becomes superior to legal
sovereignty. However, since 1952 the Japanese political and economic situations and her relationship with the United States have
been changing significantly in accord with modifications of world
politics.
In 1963 the ten-year term of the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty expired and now may be readily terminated upon one year's notice by
any of the three nations concerned. Presently Japan is independent
enough of the United States that she may openly declare nonacceptance of the rationale that only the nation in whose rivers
salmon spawn may possess exclusive rights to that particular fish
resource. In other words, Japan is capable of claiming and exercising
her legal sovereignty.
As was mentioned in the text of the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty,
and as further scientific evidence collected by the North Pacific
Fisheries Commission indicates, Asian and American origin salmon
intermingle over vast areas of the central North Pacific where
Japanese fishermen are permitted to pursue fishing operations. It is
impossible for any fishermen to fish for salmon in this particular area
without taking a mixed catch.' 1 Since neither the American fisher10. E. Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy 5-11 (1957).
11. As to the decision whether 175 degrees west longitude line satisfactorily divided
American- and Asian-origin salmon, W. Herrington in his testimony [Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (June 1952)] explained:
[T] hat compromise on the hundred and seventy-fifth meridian was the result
of a long discussion. It resulted from the fact that the scientific evidence to
the extent of the stocks of salmon in the Bering Sea, those salmon coming
from the coast of North America and those coming from the coast of Asia, the
evidence was very limited, and after long discussion, the delegations agreed
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men nor the U.S. Government can find an equitable means to resolve
this problem, they have decided to push for extension of the "provisional" line ten degrees further westward toward Japan.' 2
In this respect the two most pertinent controversies in regard to
the present fishing dispute are, first of all, to determine whether the
principle of voluntary abstention is really applicable to an international fishing agreement, and, secondly, to determine whether the
provisional line, drawn at 175 degrees west longitude for the division
of American and Asian-origin salmon in the North Pacific is really
equitable.' '
First, neither American nor Canadian fishermen have engaged in
salmon fishing on the high seas on a large scale. They do not consider
upon drawing a provisional line ... and it provided further in this protocol
that one of the first jobs for the new commission would be to make a study of
the salmon in the area to find out whether this was the best Line for dividing
the two stocks, otherwise, some different line should be substituted for it.
In regard to the interpretation of the original function of the "provisional line," there is a
definite difference between Japan and the United States. W. M. Terry, Assistant Director for
International Affairs, U.S. Dept. of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, wrote me (Letter
from W. M. Terry to T. Nishi, Dec. 19, 1966) stating in part:
When it was found that the Japanese were taking substantial quantities of
Bristol Bay red salmon, the United States section of the Commission ... recommended that the provisional line of 175 degrees west longitude
be moved further west. The Japanese section did not agree with the United
States recommendation and has maintained the position that the Protocol to
the Convention should be interpreted to mean that the provisional line was
established for the purpose of dividing the area where salmon of Asian and
North American origin intermingle. The United States has maintained that the
provisional line was established for the purpose of protecting all salmon of
North American origin. Since no interpretation of the Protocol has been
agreed upon, it has not been possible to move the provisional line farther
westward. In some years the Japanese high seas fleets take substantial quantities of Bristol Bay red salmon and, therefore, affect the conservation programs of the United States.
Interestingly, the Protocol in question reads in part:
If such areas are found the Commission shall conduct suitable studies to
determine a line or fines which best divide salmon of Asiatic origin and salmon
of Canadian and United States or American origin, from which certain Contracting Parties have agreed to abstain ... (emphasis added).
It seems obvious that since the absolute monopoly of American-origin salmon by the United
States has proved a failure, the U.S. Government sees no reason why such legality-according to the present articles of the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty-should be mechanically applied
to the resources in question. The U.S. Government believes that it must establish another
"new" legality which is best suited to protect its national exclusive interests in regard to the
resources. Consequently, the United States formulated and applied authoritative interpretation and justification of legality (legal vindication) to its exclusive claim.
12. See S. Oda, International Control of Sea Resources, 70-71 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as Oda].
13. On a more concrete level, the line extends over 600 miles off of Bristol Bay, and
2,000 miles from Seattle.
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it necessary insofar as the abstention principle presently applied to
Japanese fishermen is maintained. That salmon are anadromous in
nature and thus return to breed in rivers within American and
Canadian territories where fishermen of these countries can carry out
their fishing activities economically, is the major reason high seas
fishing has remained relatively unimportant or unexploited.
Although the governments of the United States and Canada
exercise conservation regulations on their fishermen, particularly
concerning salmon and halibut, for the necessity of maintaining
maximum sustainable yields, should both governments be permitted
to violate the principle of freedom of the high seas by extending and
exercising their criteria for needs over Japanese fishing vessels in
order to secure high seas resources for their own exclusive use?
It is well understood that the governments of the United States
and Canada have spent great amounts of time, effort and money in
maintaining maximum sustainable yields of salmon and halibut.
However, does this fact offer a sufficient rationale for the governments of both nations to claim exclusive rights to those high seas
resources? Simply because both governments exercise strict domestic
conservation regulations, which inevitably engender "sacrifices" on
their fishermen, do they then have the right to impose their own
domestic conservation regulations on Japanese fishing activities on
the high seas? If the governments of the United States and Canada,
pursuing their fishing activities to the maximum sustainable yields of
high seas resources, are permitted to inflict their domestic conservation policies on Japanese fishermen on the high seas, what is the
necessity for Article III of the 1952 Tripartite Fisheries Treaty,
which states in part as follows:
(a) In regard to any stock of fish specified in the Annex, study for

the purpose of determination annually whether such stock continues
to qualify for abstention under the provisions of Article IV. If the

Commission determines that such stock no longer meets the conditions of Article IV, the Commission shall recommend that it be
removed from the Annex.
Though in accord with this Article the Commission recommended in
1963 that halibut be removed from the Annex, and though all three
nations accepted it, this recommendation was greatly restricted in its
application regarding the halibut fishing areas available to Japanese
fishermen, besides reducing the annual total catch of halibut for
three nations within the so-called "triangular area." This does not
mean halibut fishing operations of both Canadian and U.S. fishermen
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Since open halibut

fishing areas and the maximum amount of catch permitted for
Japanese fishermen are so limited, the practical effect of such a
recommendation for removing an abstention on halibut in this par-

ticular triangular area is trivial from an economic standpoint. That is,
the Japanese fishing industry is reluctant to carry out its halibut

fishing operations there. In the case of salmon, it is almost certain
there will be no recommendation for Japanese participation in the
salmon fishery by the Commission, which requires unanimity for
implementing its recommendations.
14. The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission Report states regarding the
decision of removing the abstention principle on halibut:
At the 1962 Annual Meeting of the Commission it was determined that the
halibut stock of the eastern Bering Sea no longer met the abstention provisions
of the Convention and it was therefore recommended that this stock be removed from the Annex to the Convention [i.e., no longer be subject to abstention by Japanese fishermen]. In order for a stock to be removed from
abstention, it is necessary that all three governments approve the Commission's recommendation. In this case, approvals were received by the Commission on the following dates: from Japan on February 26, 1963; from the
United States on March 23, 1962; and from Canada on May 8, 1963. Therefore, on May 8, 1963, Japanese fishermen were no longer required to abstain
from fishing halibut in the eastern Bering Sea.
... In the North Pacific Ocean south of the Alaska Peninsula and in the Gulf
of Alaska the situation is somewhat different from that in the eastern Bering
Sea. In this great area, comprising the principal halibut fishing ground of
Canadian and United States fishermen, no change has been recommended
insofar as abstention is concerned. That is, Japanese fishermen continue to
abstain from fishing halibut in this area. Int'l N. Pac. Fisheries Comm'n
Annual Rep. 12 (1963) [hereinafter cited as INPFC].
At the 1964 Annual Meeting... the Commission again conducted studies
to determine whether any stock of halibut remaining in the Annex to the
Convention continued to meet the abstention requirement of Article IV. No
agreement was reached in the Commission as to whether such stocks continued to qualify for abstention. Therefore, the Commission made no recommendation that any stocks now listed in the Annex no longer met the conditions of Article IV of the Convention. The practical effect of this is that
halibut south of the Aleutian Islands and in the Gulf of Alaska continue under
abstention from fishing by Japanese fishermen. INPFC Annual Rep. 10
(1964).
According to the Commission's recommendation of 1963, Japan is still permitted to fish for
halibut in the "triangular area" (the area bounded by a line connecting Cape Navarin and
the northern tip of Cape Sarichef on Unimak Island, the meridian of 170 degrees west
longitude and the Aleutian Islands). However, there was a major reduction of the total catch
limit for the three signatory nations. The Commission recommended that the catch be
reduced to a maximum of 2,900 metric tons (6,393,340 pounds) from the 1963 quota of
5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) for 1964. Also, a fishing season of only seven days,
from April 4 to 11, was recommended. "In the brief 1965 season, 27 Canadian and United
States vessels operated in the former quota area. No Japanese vessels participated in the
fishery. Total production was 251 metric tons (553,000 pounds) dressed weight." INPFC
Annual Rep. 8-13 (1965).
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At the present, Soviet fishing activities in the North Pacific, for
example, are not subject to the abstention principle. The Soviet
Union fishes extensively for nearly every kind of bottom fish except
halibut. Such Soviet activities have caused very serious concern not
only among American fishermen and fisheries industries but also
among the other signatories of the Tripartite Fisheries Treaty-Japan
and Canada-simply because such extensive fishing activities by a
non-signatory nation eventually are certain to nullify the function of
the treaty.' s However, there presently exists an agreement between
the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union that the
latter shall not pursue its fishing activities within the 12-mile exclusive fishing zone measured from the coast of the United States.1 6
Why should the abstention principle apply only to Japanese fishing operations, while other nations, such as the Soviet Union and
South Korea, which are highly efficient and competent in their
operations, are totally free from such a limitation and may fish for
salmon or halibut anywhere outside the U.S. 12-mile limit if they
wish to. This further questions the validity of applying the abstention principle to international fishing and conservation regulations. It
will be interesting to note how the governments of the United States
and Canada, in the near future, approach the Soviet Union-one of
the nations chiefly opposing the abstention principle' ' -to persuade
15. One of the primary purposes of this fisheries treaty at the time of its formulation was
the establishment of buttresses against Communist "encroachment" in the Far East, i.e., the
containment of Communist expansion. At the same time, Soviet Russia was scarcely
involved in high seas fisheries in the North Pacific fishing area now in question. Thus, the
United States and Canada did not feel an immediate need to protect their salmon or halibut
from Soviet Russia. As a consequence, Soviet Russia was disregarded as a possible signatory
to the treaty. In this respect, Japan was the primary party from whom the United States was
seeking to protect these high seas resources.
16. A few violations by Russian fishermen have occurred since the agreements on
February 14, 1967. On March 2, 1967, the first Russian trawler was captured by the U.S.
Coast Guard and fined $5,000; the second Russian trawler was seized by the U.S. Coast
Guard on March 22, 1967, and fined $10,000. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1967, at 82, col. 7;id.
Mar. 26, 1967, at 15, cot. 2. The U.S.'s third case against a Russian trawler captured on
August 3, 1967, for alleged illegal fishing ended with the U.S. dismissing criminal charges
and Russia agreeing to an out-of-court settlement of a civil suit. The Soviet government
agreed to pay $20,000 if the U.S. government dropped its admiralty suit against the gear of
the Russian trawler in question. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 8, 1967, at 13, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Aug. 15, 1967, at 29, col. 5. The Washington State Patrol flies weekly missions off
the Washington coast to investigate Russian fishing operations, in addition to twice-a-week
patrols by a Coast Guard surveillance mission. See Seattle Times Aug. 4, 1967, at 1, col. 4.
It should be remembered that the Soviet Union is one of the oldest nations that has
claimed the 12-mile-limit for territorial waters.
17. The Soviet delegate at the Geneva Conference (1958) stated:
There were no real grounds for holding utilization principally responsible for
The need for
the reduction in size of the stocks of the species in question ....
a limitation of yield, amounting in certain instances to complete temporary
prohibition of fishing, arose in very rare cases only-e.g., with regard to easily
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her that salmon and halibut of American origin belong to the United
States and Canada, no matter how far they swim from the North
American continent.
Secondly, since salmon of both American and Asian origin intermingle in that area of the North Pacific between 160 degrees west
longitude and 170 degrees east longitude, Soviet fishermen can pursue their fishing activities without violating any international laws or
agreements. Presently no definite scientific data exist regarding the
number of salmon intermingling in the area. Thus, it is impossible to
equitably divide them, even if such a division really posed a solution
to the problem. Further, if the United States claims the exclusive
right to fish for particular high seas resources, such exclusivity may
engender Soviet counter claims of exclusivity to other high seas resources, such as the Asian-origin salmon.
What is more, why should the abstention principle be applied only
to certain fish? The answer to this question lies in both the historic
and contemporary social and economic needs of the United States,
and in the time, effort and money spent by the U.S. Government in
maintaining maximum sustainable yields of specific fish such as
salmon and halibut. If this is so, why must only U.S. needs be
favored, and the United States allowed to pursue the maximum sustainable yields, while the needs of Japan are not fully considered?
Who decides who has the right to fish for what? Who imposes whose
conservation regulations on whom?"8 W. W. Bishop, Jr., ardent advocate of the abstention principle, emphasizes that:
Under these peculiar circumstances-in which a program of intensive
research and conservation is already under way and regulations effectively enforced, in which productivity of the resource is being
maintained at the maximum sustainable level and is dependent upon
the program of regulation and control, and in which the introduction of additional fishing vessels would cut down, rather than
increase, the overall benefits from the fishery-it seems reasonable to
fished stocks such as plaice, turbot, salmon, etc., in certain limited areas. The
principle of abstention meant abstention from overfishing in cases where
overfishing could be objectively proved. It was difficult to understand why
that principle should apply only to newcomers or to those who were not
fishing the stock regularly. Johnston, supra note 1, at 296.
18. In regard to this question, S. Riesenfeld, Protection of Coastal Fisheries Under
International Law 2 (1942) described as follows:
Any such study of international law is faced at the threshold with a difficult
methodological problem .... namely: how can one find out what the law is?
Who are the authorities to be consulted and what is their evidential
value? ... It will suffice to say that the three great sources from which one
can ascertain the status of international law pertaining to a specific issue are a)
text writer, b) state practice and c) international adjudications. The authority
of these sources probably increases in the order named.
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follow the North Pacific Treaty and to require that states which have

not1 engaged in fishing in that particular fishery abstain from doing
SO. 9

However, it must be pointed out that although both the American
and Canadian governments have exercised intensive research and conservation and strict regulations on their own fishermen in order to
maintain the maximum sustainable yields of specific fisheries resources, and although "the introduction of additional vessels could
cut down ... the overall benefits from the fishery" on the part of

American and Canadian fishermen, these are, after all, simply
domestic conservation regulations the U.S. and Canada use in order
to achieve their own domestic needs and interests. If such domestic
needs and interests of particular nations which by their very nature
are ambiguous, constitute a sufficient and reasonable rationale for
excluding other nations from joining fishing activities for high seas
resources, it appears almost impossible to define what is or is not a
"sufficient" and "reasonable" rationale for the application of the
abstention principle. Again, this raises the question of who decides
whose rationale is superior.
A case in point which illustrates the above discussion in terms of
salient national needs and interests is whether or not any difference
exists between the abstention principle as defined in the Tripartite
Treaty and as defined in the Santiago Declaration of 1952. This is
not an argument in terms of national sovereignty; the Santiago
Declaration imposes national sovereignty of its signatories, Chile,
Ecuador, and Peru, over any other nation within a 200-mile "marine
zone," while the abstention principle as defined in the Tripartite
Treaty is not concerned with the national sovereignty of any nation.
The most pertinent aspect of this discussion is the fact that both
the abstention principle and the Santiago Declaration stem solely
from national interests and needs for certain high seas resources and
19. Bishop, The 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1206, 1226 (1962).
Oda, supra note 12, at 89-90. emphasiaed his opposition as follows:
The fact that "the expenditure of time, effort, and money on research and
management" was for the purpose of keeping resources at the maximum yield
of sustainable productivity, is not negligible. But, should we accept that all
other states are to abstain from fishing in an area where the resources are being
utilized by specific states? Is it reasonable to deprive other states of potential
interests in fishing only because they have not engaged in fishing in an area
previously? It is submitted that if we accept this principle, we are introducing
a doctrine very similar to acquisitive prescription into the law of the sea. This
is completely contrary to the concept of freedom of the high seas.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

their acquisition. Therefore, if one nation utilizes its own domestic
needs and interests in justifying exclusive claims to a certain high seas
resource, such justification engenders the possibility of justification
of another nation's claim to exclusive use of specific high seas resources, depending upon its own domestic needs and interests for the
present and future exploitation of those high seas resources. This
trend eventually leads to legal anarchy regarding the status of high
seas resources.
Even if Japan, which has contributed nothing to the conservation
of American-origin salmon and halibut stocks in the past, wishes to
join and contribute in the future development of these high seas
resources, Canada and the United States maintain a strong antipathy
toward accepting such a proposal. Undoubtedly, Japan shall never
have the opportunity to join and contribute to these high seas resources. This fact is used by the United States and Canada to enforce
the abstention principle and further to refuse Japanese proposals for
a joint international conservation program.
As to the much-emphasized point that Asian- and American-origin
salmon are anadromous, if such a biological fact is taken as sufficient
reason for any state to impose its exclusive right to fish for any stock
which returns to breed within that nation's territory, what happens
when some nation, within whose territorial waters such a stock (e.g.,
tuna, mackerel) migrates or remains for a limited or unlimited length
of time, claims the stock in question as belonging exclusively to that
nation? By this rationale, Pacific tuna eventually would become the
exclusive possession of certain Latin-American nations.
Although there is a definite geographical delineation to be made
between land and ocean, as far as a particular nation's sovereignty
and its exercise is concerned there exists no gap between the land
and the territorial waters. Thus the fact that salmon return to spawn
in rivers within U.S. territory does not seem to offer sufficient basis
for the claim of exclusivity by the United States. This is a question
of which nation's scientific biological criteria for exclusive claim to a
certain fish stock should be favored. Since on the level of international law no definite biological standard or criterion exists for
determining exclusivity of claims, this becomes a circular argument
manipulating one side of the coin against the other, resulting in a net
impasse.
Despite three major conferences since 1963 held in Washington
D.C., Tokyo, and Ottawa, respectively, concerning the revision of the
Tripartite Fisheries Treaty, neither Japan, the United States nor
Canada has changed its basic standpoint, particularly on salmon and
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halibut protocols and no compromising settlement whatever has been
reached.2 0
Although the United States is dissatisfied with the present fisheries
treaty which has failed to protect every American-origin salmon
migrating beyond the "provisional line" on the North Pacific, she
remains in a position far superior to Japan concerning these high seas
resources. In such a position, the United States probably would
prefer to maintain the status quo of the present treaty by not convening negotiation of revision, especially if it turns out to be the case
that she perceives no hope of resolving the question of mutually
incompatible interests in the use of high seas resources, or if she feels
any danger of a threat that Japan might abrogate the entire provisions of this treaty as a reaction against excessive pressure of U.S.
demands upon Japan. On the other hand, Japan, if possible, desires
to abolish the principle of voluntary abstention, or at least to maintain the status quo of the present treaty, instead of permitting the
United States to push for the extension of the "provisional line" ten
degrees further west toward Japan, as she presently has been proposing. Thus, if each nation, seeing no possibility of any better
resolution of the present dispute, desires to preserve the status quo
of the present treaty, there arises no necessity for either having
future negotiations with the other.
Unfortunately, the present fishing controversy between Japan and
the United States contains a built-in mechanism for intensifying the
conflict. The U.S. Government takes a hostile and inflexible attitude
toward Japanese fishing activities and claims. This U.S. action receives strong support from its own citizens-particularly from the
West Coast fishermen, who have taken such action as attempting to
mobilize a boycott of Japanese merchandise. 2 1 The Japanese Government, supported by its own citizens, responds with similarly hostile
and rigid moves toward U.S. government actions. This gives added
impetus for the United States to take a more inflexible stand toward
20. See Johnston, supra note 1, at 280-82. The question of necessity of convening
further negotiation for the revision of the treaty for both Japan and the United States must
be taken into account. If there are to be no negotiations for further revision, and none of
the three signatories gives a year's notice of abrogation of the treaty, the treaty will remain
as effective as before. In such a case, Japan must observe the present principle of abstention
by receiving no reciprocal gains or benefits from it, while the United States and Canada,
exercising "necessary" conservation regulations, continue to fish for the high seas resources
in question to their maximum sustainable yields.
21. A case in point: On May 26, 1965, delegates to the biennial convention of the
Seafarers International Union of North America urged the Union to boycott Japanese
products if Japanese fleets continued to intercept Bristol Bay salmon runs. See N.Y. Times,
May 27, 1965, at 73, col. 8. West Coast fishermen frequently declared boycotts of Japanese
merchandise.
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the fishing dispute. At the same time, the same process goes on

within Japan. Thus, there exists positive reinforcement for both
governments in terms of the justification of their own positions. This
vicious circle of interaction between Japan and the United States
makes it increasingly difficult to reverse the self-perpetuating atti-

tudes and perceptions of inflexibility on both sides in terms of exclusive national claims to, and "necessary conservation" of, the resources in question. 2 2 The fishing dispute possesses not only such

complications as the mutual distrust and threats by each disputant
toward the fishing activities of the other and exclusive and inflexible

national claims to particular fishing resources, but also the ambiguity
of interpretation and application of the concept of freedom of the
high seas.

Further, deep mutual misperceptions of the situation add to the
threat perceived by both nations of liquidation of strong political,
economic and social alliances, which further promote the vicious

circle of events.' 3 Insofar as these negative variables persist, any
22. R. Cooley, Politics and Conservation: The Decline of Alaska Salmon 189-92 (1963),
described this vicious circle as follows:
As the Japanese catch increased and the Alaska catch continued its downward
trend, the American interests began to see a grim relationship between the two
phenomena even though there was no scientific basis upon which to
substantiate this circumstantial evidence .... The clamor increased and in a
short time Japan had become the primary scapegoat for nearly all the ills
besetting the Alaska salmon fishery ....
However, the downward trend in
salmon harvests began almost two decades before the Japanese started fishing
on the high seas. Scientific research by the American section indicates that the
Japanese high-seas salmon fishery has had little adverse impact on American
catches except with respect to the important red salmon runs into Bristol Bay,
and even here the relationship is not fully known. It is not only a distortion of
the facts to blame the Japanese for the present widespread depleted condition
of the Alaska salmon runs, but the existence of this convenient scapegoat has
tended to distract from conservation issues on the domestic level. Even if
equitable means are found to prevent the Japanese from catching
American-spawned salmon on the high seas, the danger of complete
destruction of the resource still exists.
American fishermen did not perceive or want to perceive anything else but that Japanese
"overfishing" was the main cause of the decline of the Alaskan salmon fishery. For instance,
in 1965, a big salmon run hit Bristol Bay and Alaska's Governor William A. Egan linked this
big salmon run to absence of Japanese fleets that had moved west of the "provisional line"
after the U.S. Coast Guard had seized a Japanese fishing vessel early in June. See N.Y.
Times, July 3, 1965, at 11, col. 1.
23. In addition, possible liquidation of heavy purchase of Japanese canned or frozen
marine products, such as tuna, king crab, even salmon, is frequently considered as constituting a major retaliation by the United States if Japan proclaims the abolition of the
abstention principle. [The United States purchased 34%, 31%, 29%, and 27%, in 1962,
1963, 1964, and 1965, respectively, out of the total amount of Japanese marine products
exported. See Suisan Nenkan 110-11 (1967).] With this in mind, the Japanese Government
feels it cannot risk such a serious blow to the Japanese economy.
Washington Representative Thomas M. Pelly introduced the bill, both in 1958 and 1959,
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resolution of the present fishing conflict is hardly expected in the
near future.
Lastly, it should be remembered that the inherent ambiguity of
international law and its lack of centralized enforcement of authority
provide a nation-state with a wide flexibility whereby it may first
execute unilaterally whatever policy it deems necessary, and after
that formulate specific legal justification for its policy. In other
words, the most difficult question of who decides what is legally
justifiable for whom, under what conditions and how, is an urgent
matter to be resolved regarding this international conflict.

which essentially urged the prohibition of "the importation into the United States of
salmon in any form taken by nationals of any country which permits fishing for salmon by
nets on the high seas of the North Pacific Ocean at times and places where large quantities
of immature salmon of North American origin or intermingled North American salmon runs
occur. Under the circumstances existing, it would have applied only to importations from
Japan." See Whiteman, supra note 1, at 1192-93.

